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Most occupational choice models introduce only two options for
agents: entrepreneurial activities or wage-employment. However, these
models represent inadequately the labor force distribution from devel-
oping countries, where an important proportion of the total work force
are self-employed workers. Some models introduce self-employment
as an occupational choice. These works have a common feature: at
equilibrium, wage earners belong to the lower end of the income distri-
bution. However, for a large set of developing countries, peasants and
small proprietors are part of a self employment sector that can mostly
be found in the lower end of the income distribution. In this work, in
contrast with previous eﬀorts, self-employment formation is consistent
with data from most developing countries. We pay special attention to
the conditions under which either the economy ends in a low income
equilibrium, where self-employment is the only form of production; or
alternatively, a high income equilibrium with a well developed labor
market. We study some public policy issues, paying special attention
to role of capital markets and the eﬃciency of schooling. JEL classi-
ﬁcation: J24, 012. Key words: Occupational Choice, Human Capital,
Economic Development, General Equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Traditional general equilibrium models in economics consider only one oc-
cupational choice: workers. Firms are simply anonymous entities for whom
agents work for a salary. Nevertheless, there have been some eﬀorts that try
to build models with a richer set of occupational choices. Lucas (1978) is one
of the most representative early eﬀorts in this direction: he builds a model
where agents, depending on their entrepreneurial abilities, choose between
either being entrepreneurs or workers. On a diﬀerent type of model, devel-
oped by Kihlstrom and Laﬀont (1979), agents diﬀer on their level of risk
aversion: agents with low risk aversion will chose entrepreneurial activities.
However, these representations of the occupational choices of agents are
probably adequate for developed countries, where most agents are either
entrepreneurs or workers. Nonetheless, these models are an inadequate way
of representing the labor force distribution from less developed countries,
where an important proportion of the population are self-employed workers.1
Any research work whose main purpose is to analyze and comprehend the
main economic and social problems faced by the poorest people in developing
countries must include study self-employment formation.
Banerjee and Newman (1993), built a model where self-employment is an
occupational choice and the decisions are based on an initial wealth distri-
bution. Because of the existence of a collateral, rich individuals can receive
a loan in order become high scale entrepreneurs, while agents located in the
middle of the initial wealth distribution receive smaller loans that allows
them to enter to self-employment with a low scale production process. In
the other hand, agents in the lower end of the wealth distribution, with-
out high enough collateral, can only join wage-employment. However, it is
important to notice that, in developing countries, an important proportion
of agents that have self-employment as their occupational choice, live on
economic activities that provide only a subsistence level of income and are
poorer than wage earners. Furthermore, some empirical studies show that
self employment, besides been a important and growing sector in some de-
veloping countries, it can be found mostly in the lower end of the income
distribution.2 Therefore, it seems that the model developed by Banerjee and
1For a group of African countries, Mead and Liedhold (1998), report that workers in
some form of self-employment double the amount of agents engage in wage employment;
furthermore, a work by Galli and Kucera (2003) for 14 Latin American countries reports
that on 1997 the average relative size of self-employment was 27%, with 3 points increase
in only seven years. Furthermore, a work by Mezal (1998) presents data for Mexico where
62% of all individuals without schooling have self employment as its occupational choice.
2On a meta-analysis that includes several empirical studies, Van der Sluis, Van Praag,3
Newman (1993) does not accommodates these stylized facts for developing
countries.
More models that attempt to study self employment dynamics have been
developed. For example, Antunes and Cavalcanti (2002) build a general
equilibrium model where agents are diﬀerentiated by their entrepreneurial
ability (as in Lucas (1978)); however, as in Banerjee and Newman (1993),
wage earners belong to the lower end of the income distribution.
Our work is an eﬀort to build a model that rationalizes the empirical
observations for developing countries where wage earners income is higher
than those agents in self-employment. We build a general equilibrium model
where the occupational choice decision is endogenous to the model and, as
in Lucas (1978), the amount of human capital plays a decisive role. On a
key assumption of our model, we introduce two production functions, one
that uses high skill labor, while the second one requires low skill labor.
On a second key assumption, we introduce a labor market for high skills,
where agents that do not have high enough administrative skills to per-
form entrepreneurial activities will engage in wage-employment rather than
choosing self employment as an alternative. We believe that this is assump-
tion is not very far from reality, where well educated individuals, if they are
not entrepreneurs, can till ﬁnd highly payed jobs on the economy. Previous
works lack a labor market for high skills. Therefore, in our model, agents
in self-employment have a lower income than wage earners, result that is
consistent with observations from developing countries.
Empirical studies argue that improved managerial ability has a positive
impact on entrepreneurial activities since it enhances the expected income
from these activities. However, this channel also moves in the opposite di-
rection, where schooling has a negative impact on entrepreneurial activities
since agents leave self-employment and move to wage-employment (see Le
(1999), Blau (1985) and Van Praag and Cramer (2001)). Our model sup-
ports these observations: at low levels of human capital, improvements in
schooling attainments produces a transition from self-employment toward
wage employment, while at high levels of human capital, improved edu-
cation creates a migration from wage employment favoring entrepreneurial
activities.
Looking into empirical data, we see that still an important percentage
of low human capital agents choose to be poorly payed workers, even if
and Vijverberg (2003) point out that there is great consistency between studies that ﬁnd
that education lowers the likelihood of self-employment on developing countries, with more
educated agents ending up in wage employment.4
the average income from self-employment is higher. Probably the lack of
initial wealth (as in Banerjee and Newman (1993)) or risk aversion (as in
Kihlstrom and Laﬀont (1979)) helps to explain this fact. It seems that
the complete story is a combination of three explanatory variables: human
capital, risk aversion and initial wealth. However, besides the technical
diﬃculties of introducing to the model a joint distribution function, this
work will concentrate on human capital because of two additional reasons:
it is easier to collect data relating income with years of schooling in order
to make empirical testing of the model, and secondly, empirical ﬁndings
(see Van der Sluis, Van Praag, and Vijverberg (2003) and Van Praag and
Cramer (2001)) show that education is the crucial variable in occupational
choice decisions, entrepreneurship selection and entrepreneurial success on
developing countries.
In contrast to previous eﬀorts, for reasons later explained, our model
is static. In the Banerjee and Newman (1993) paper, where the model is
dynamic, they pay special attention to the initial conditions under which the
economy either converges to a modern economy with a well developed labor
market, or one where only self-employment is the only form of production.
On our case, we study conditions where the only equilibrium is either self-
employment or a modern economy with entrepreneurs and wage earners. We
lack an analysis of convergence; nevertheless, our more simple setup allows
for a broader analysis of policy issues.
A crucial issue that Banerjee and Newman (1993) want to address is why
do some countries become economies with entrepreneurs employing workers
in large factories, while other countries remain represented mainly by small
proprietors and peasants. Unfortunately, in the model they build, the size of
business ﬁrms in exogenous to the model. Therefore, they can not study the
conditions under which the economy is represented by small or large ﬁrms.
In our work, where the size of business ﬁrms is endogenous to the model,
we overcome this problem.
An issue that the current paper will address is regarding the relation-
ship between per capita income and the relative size of the self-employment
sector. We prove that the relationship it is not necessarily negative: we
build economies where policies that increase the relative size of the self-
employment sector could also produce higher per capita income. Addition-
ally, this work will address some policy issues, paying special attention to
the presence of borrowing constraints and the eﬃciency of schooling.5
2 An Economy with Self-Employment
Is it the lack of job opportunities what pushes agents into self-employment
in the informal sector? For example, Harris and Todaro (1969) argue that
migrant workers from agricultural to the industrial sector might temporarily
be forced to join low productive activities, where scarcity of jobs and costly
job search are in good part responsible. The answer to this question is ex-
tremely important for our purposes. If the existence of self-employment is
explained by lack of opportunities then, instead of using a general equilib-
rium setup, a disequilibrium model or one with labor market rigidities could
be the most appropriate to study self-employment dynamics. However, re-
cent empirical ﬁndings suggest that self-employment selection is a decision
based on income maximization rather than the result from lack of employ-
ment opportunities (see Van der Sluis, Van Praag, and Vijverberg (2003),
Psacharopoulos (1994) and Maloney (1999). Therefore, it seems adequate
to choose a rational choice type model in order to address the occupational
choice issues from developing economies.
The economy has a continuum of agents which are identify by their
educational level. More precisely,
i ∈ [0,1]
where i∗ = 1 represents the individual with the highest schooling level. We
choose to build a model where the level of Human Capital is an exogenous
variable because of two main reasons: ﬁrst of all, in order to study en-
dogenous human capital issues, to introduce dynamic decisions will greatly
complicate the model, and secondly, an exogenous human capital distribu-
tion will allow us to analyze several public policy alternatives.
Agents can perform two types of activities: low skill and high skill.
These abilities can be used either on entrepreneurial activities or wage-
employment. We introduce a h(i) function that transforms schooling into
low skill productivity. Probably no far from reality, we assume that low
skill productivity is independent of schooling and that all agents are equally
capable of performing low skill activities, that is
h(i) = h for all i,
We now introduce a function H(i) that transforms schooling level i into
productivity in a high skill occupation. Not far away from reality, all agents
are born with a level of high skill productivity that can be improved with
more years of schooling. That is, we assume that H(0) > 0 and that H
′
(i) >6
0 for all i ≥ 0. Agents can oﬀer, for a wage, their low or high skill abilities
to the market.
The economy has two types of production technologies. The ﬁrst one
requires low skill labor and is represented by
Q(h,lh,K) = min{K,h + lh}.
That is, an agent that decides to be a low skill technology entrepreneur,
contributes with h units of low skill labor, and chooses the amount of capital
K and the units of low skill labor lh that maximizes his income as a low
skill entrepreneur (LSE), where
Ih(i) = min{K,h + lh} − whlh − rK,
r represents the rental price of capital and wh the wage rate for one unit
of low skill labor. The interest rate (or rental price of capital) r will be an
exogenous variable to the model (the following section will further discuss
this assumption). In order to have a well deﬁned maximization problem, we
introduce an exogenous borrowing constraint where the maximum amount
of capital to borrow for a LSE is ¯ k.3
An agent i that decides to operate a high skill ﬁrm, requires K units of
capital, provides H(i) units of administrative work, and hires lH units of
high skill (HS) labor.4 The production technology is represented by
Q(H(i),K) = min{KH(i),lH},
thus the income for a high skill entrepreneur (HSE) is
IH(i) = min{KH(i),lH} − wHlH − rK.
As in the low skill (LS) technology case, in order to have a well deﬁned
maximization problem, we introduce a borrowing constraint where ¯ K rep-
resents the constraint for a HSE. An important diﬀerence between the HS
and the LS technologies is that the HS technology requires two types of
3Other works also assume the existence of market imperfections and introduce bor-
rowing constraints. In the work by Banerjee and Newman (1993), these constraints are
crucial to the structure of the model, where they attached the constraint level to the
amount of collateral. We could have done something similar by allowing the borrowing
level to be dependent upon the schooling level. However, the main results of our paper
remain unchanged after incorporating this assumption.
4As in previous works, we could think of the entrepreneur as an administrator that
performs monitoring activities where, without this activity, worker´s eﬀort is low and
production is zero.7
labor: HS labor and an administrator of capital, which is a high skill occu-
pation, while the LS technology only requires LS labor. In order to simplify
matters, there is no market for administrator activities, which means that
a high skill entrepreneur (HSE) must use his/her high skill abilities in order
to fulﬁll this activity. Since H(i) is increasing in i, a highly educated agent
will be a better administrator. Also, notice that the high skill production
function was deﬁned in such a way a good administrator (i.e. one with more
schooling) will do a better job at monitoring workers and will optimally hire
more labor than a less capable one.5 We know that a HSE will optimally
choose lH = ¯ KH(i), therefore
IH(i) = ¯ K[H(i) − wHH(i) − r]. (1)
Notice that the rental price of capital does not has a subindex h. This
reﬂects that, in order to simplify matters, there is only one market for capital
(i.e. there is no low and high quality capital). Assuming that the HS
technology uses HS labor and not LS labor, is central to the results of this
work, since it introduces a labor market for HS labor that opens diﬀerent
occupational choices for highly educated agents. As it will be explained
in the following section, this assumption will allow us to have a group of
middle income agents that work for a salary and that are richer than agents
in self-employment.
In order to simplify matters, since the presence of a LS labor market
could greatly complicate the analysis, we introduce our last assumption.
Recall that the income of a LSE is Ih(i) = min{¯ k,h + lh} − whlh − r¯ k. We
assume that ¯ k < h. Therefore, since it is redundant to hire LS workers, we
have lh = 0 and
Ih(i) = ¯ k(1 − r). (2)
This assumption rules out a demand for LS labor, therefore a LSE can
only be engaged in self-employment activities. Since, there is no demand
for LS labor, at equilibrium wh = 0 therefore, in order to simplify notation,
in the remaining of the paper we drop the H index from wH since there is
only one equilibrium wage rate that is higher than zero.
Wrapping up, LS labor can only be used in self-employment activities,
while high skill labor could be used in HS entrepreneurial activities or wage-
employment. That is, there are only three occupational choices where the
5In a following section, this assumption will allow us to study the average size of
business ﬁrms. In the work by Banerjee and Newman (1993), this can not be done since
the ﬁrm size is determine exogenously and never changes, only the number of ﬁrms vary.8
set O = {h,W,H} represents these choices6 and equations 1 and 2 represent
the income function for HSE and LSE respectively, while the income for a
HS worker is represented by
IW(i) = wH(i). (3)
Figure 1 draws the income functions for the three occupational choices.
Notice that all agents such that H(i) < H1 will choose to be LSE, while
agents such that H1 < H(i) < H2 will prefer to work for a wage, and a
HSE is an agent i such that H(i) > H2. The ﬁgure is drawn without paying
attention to the exogenous and endogenous parameters of the economy. As
a mater of fact, later on we prove that at equilibrium, under speciﬁc values
of the exogenous parameters, it could be the case that no agents chooses to
be a LSE, and under diﬀerent parameters, there is only an equilibrium with
self employment activities.
Recall that the income for self-employment activities does not increases
with schooling. However, empirical evidence does not supports this as-
sumption. Results from Van der Sluis, Van Praag and Vijverberg (2003)
and Psacharopoulos (1994), show that one year of schooling raises self-
employment income by an average 5%. Nevertheless, these studies also
show that the return of schooling is lower for self-employment than for wage-
employement(10%), a fact that our model supports.
The occupational choice problem for agent i is straigthforward,
C(i) = {n ∈ O : ∄ m ∈ O such that Im(i) > In(i)},
where O represents the set of occupational choices. Notice that if two oc-
cupations generate the same income to agent i both will be included in the
choice set of this agent.
The set of agents that select occupational choice n is represented by
θn(ξ,w) = {i ∈ [0,1] : n ∈ C(i)}
where w is our endogeneous variable and ξ = { ¯ K,¯ k,r,H(i)} represents the
set of exogeneous parameters of the model. The main objective of this
6An extension to the model could consist in introducing an unemployment choice to-
gether with unemployment compensations, however this work will not follow this line of
research. Also notice that the set occupational choices set O lacks an i subscript, meaning
that all agents face the same set of choices. An alternative could be to restrict choices
where, for example, only agents with a given level of schooling could have access to en-
trepreneurial activities because the need of a license to operate or the lack of access to

























Figure 1: Income for three occupational choices
work is to study the properties of the θn(ξ,w) occupational sets. Needless
to say, changes in the values of ¯ K,¯ k,H(i),r and w will modify the income
functions for each occupation, hence it will have an impact on the θn(ξ) sets.
In order to simplify notation, unless otherwise indicated, θn will represent
the occupational set θn(ξ,w). We can prove an important property of the
occupational sets (the proof is in the Appendix):
Lemma 1 θn is a convex set for all n = h,H,W.
The following proposition presents one of the main results of this paper
(the proof is left for the appendix):
Proposition 1 If i ∈ θh and i∗ ∈ θW then i ≤ i∗ and Ih(i) ≤ IW(i∗)
That is, agents that choose self-employment over wage employment have
a lower educational level and a lower income level. Therefore, the structure
of the model seems to rationalize recent empirical ﬁndings for developing
countries. The following proposition will help us to fully characterized our
main hypothesis,
Proposition 2 If i ∈ θW and i∗ ∈ θH then i ≤ i∗ and IW(i) ≤ IH(i∗)10
Therefore, HSE’s have the highest schooling level and are the richest
group in the economy. What is left of this paper, studies the properties of
our economy at equilibrium. In order to do this, we need to introduce ﬁrst
an equilibrium concept . The following section will do this.
3 Equilibrium
In order to characterize the demand and supply for labor, some notation
needs to be introduced. In particular, we need to deﬁne who are the agents
with the lowest and highest educational levels that choose an speciﬁc occu-
pation. Let inf(θn) represent the worker with the lowest human capital that
chooses occupation n. Similarly, let sup(θn) be the agent from set θn with
the highest human capital. We can easily see that (the proof is left for the
appendix):
Proposition 3 If θn (w) are not empty sets then: i) inf(θh) = 0, ii) sup(θH) =
1, iii) sup(θh)= inf(θW), and iv) sup(θW) =inf(θH).
Recall that the demand for high skill labor from agent i is lH = KH(i).
With this is mind, we now deﬁne the aggregate demand for labor, where
£d(ξ) =
(
0 if θH = ∅,
¯ K
R 1
inf(θH) H(i)di if θH  = ∅
and the aggregate supply for labor is
£s(ξ) =
(
0 if θW = ∅,
R sup(θW)
inf(θW) H(i)di if θW  = ∅.
Notice that the convexity of θn is crucial in order to have a well deﬁne
demand and supply for labor. We now present the equilibrium concept for
this economy where, as it is done in most general equilibrium models, we
ﬁrst introduce an arbitrary occupational distribution, then we ask if there is
a wage rate such that all agents choose voluntarily the occupational choice
assign to them and the labor market is at equilibrium. More precisely,
Deﬁnition 1 Let X = {Xh,XW,XH} be an array of three subsets of [0,1]
such that XW ∪ Xh ∪ XH = [0,1]. For given values of ¯ k, ¯ K and r we say
that X is an occupational equilibrium vector (OEV) if there is a wage rate
ˆ w such that: i) Xi ⊆ θn(ξ, ˆ w) for all n ∈ O (Occupational Choice) and ii)
£s( ˆ w) = £d( ˆ w) (Labor Market Equilibrium).11
Notice that in our deﬁnition for Occupational Equilibrium Vector (OEV)
there is no equilibrium condition for the capital market, we could think that
our economy is a small country that faces an exogenous interest rate and a
perfectly elastic supply for capital, an assumption also found in Banerjee and
Newman (1993), where they assumed that ﬁnancial claims are mediated by
foreign banks that lend at a ﬁxed interest rate. This assumption will allow
us later on to make some comparative statics concerning changes in interest
rates and borrowing constraints.
In order to characterize the equilibrium for this economy, we need to in-
troduce a speciﬁc representation for H(i), which transforms years of school-
ing into high skill productivity. Before doing this, assuming that an equilib-
rium exists, we can study some important properties of an OEV. What is left
of this section will concentrate on the analysis of the corner solutions of our
model (i.e. equilibriums with only self-employment or no self-employment).
4 Corner Solutions
Suppose that at a given wage rate w∗, the income as a worker of the most
educated agent (i.e. w∗H(1)) is equal to its income as a LSE (i.e. w∗H(1) =
¯ k(1−r)). If this is the case, since H(i) is decreasing in i, every agent with a
human capital lower than 1 will decide to become a LSE since this occupation
provides a higher return; furthermore, at a wage rate higher than w∗, not
even agent i = 1 will choose to be a worker. That is, since at a wage rate
lower than w∗ = ¯ k(1−r)/H(1) no agent chooses wage employment, we have
Lemma 2 If θW  = ∅ then w ≥ A1.
where A1 = ¯ k(1− r)/H(1). That is, the previous lemma presents necessary
conditions for the existence of an OEV with agents choosing wage employ-
ment.
Similarly, assume that at the wage rate w∗ the income as a worker of the
most educated agent is equal to its income as a HSE. That is,
¯ K[H(1)(1 − w∗) − r] = w∗H(1)
If this is the case, as ﬁgure 2 shows, every agent with a human capital lower
than one will not choose to be a HSE since becoming a worker provides a
higher return. Solving for w∗ we obtain,
w∗ =
¯ K










































Figure 2: IH(i) = IW(i) at H(1)
Therefore, since IW is increasing in w (i.e. it shifts upwards in ﬁgure 2)
and IH is decreasing in w (i.e. it shifts downwards), at any wage rate higher
than w∗ no agent in the economy chooses HSE as an occupational activity.
Therefore,
Lemma 3 If θH  = ∅ then w ≤ A2.
Lemmas 2 and 3 provide two necessary conditions for the existence an
OEV with high skill workers and HSE. However, this is not a strong result
since the wage rate w is the endogenous variable of the model. Nevertheless,
the following proposition presents conditions under which one of the neces-
sary conditions is always violated then, if a OEV exists, the equilibrium will
only have a self-employment sector. In order to simplify the presentation,
let A = A1 − A2.
Proposition 4 If ˆ X represents an OEV and A > 0 then ˆ X = {[0,1],∅,∅}.
The argument of the proof is straightforward. Let ˆ w represent the
equilibrium wage rate. Since A > 0 then A1 > A2. If ˆ w is such that
A1 > ˆ w > A2, because of Lemmas 2 and 3, θH( ˆ w) = ∅ and θW( ˆ w) = ∅,13
therefore the occupational distribution vector {[0,1],∅,∅} is the only OEV.
Now, choose an equilibrium wage rate that is higher than A1, because of
Lemma 2 no one will choose wage employment (i.e. θW = ∅) thus, since
ˆ w is an equilibrium wage rate, it must be the case that £s( ˆ w) = £d( ˆ w),
therefore θH = ∅ . Finally if ˆ w is lower than A2, because of Lemma 3, at
equilibrium no one is a HSE therefore θW = ∅ and X = {[0,1],∅,∅} is the
only OEV.
The previous proposition assumed than an OEV exists, nevertheless it
is easy to prove that we do not need to assume this:
Proposition 5 If A > 0 then ˆ X = {[0,1],∅,∅} is the unique OEV.
Proof. We have to ﬁnd a wage rate such that ˆ X = {[0,1],∅,∅} is an OEV.
Choose ˆ w such that A1 > ˆ w > A2. Since A > 0, this candidate wage rate
exists. Because of Lemmas 2 and 3, θH( ˆ w) = ∅ and θW( ˆ w) = ∅, we have
£s( ˆ w) = £d( ˆ w) = 0 (i.e. labor market equilibrium). We know that θW ∪
θh ∪ θH = [0,1], then at ˆ w we have θh( ˆ w) = [0,1] (i.e. occupational choice).
This proves that ˆ X = {[0,1],∅,∅} is an OEV, uniqueness is established by
proposition 4.
We can prove that the converse of proposition 5 is true (the proof is left
for the appendix). That is,
Proposition 6 If ˆ X = {[0,1],∅,∅} represents an OEV then A > 0.
The importance of the previous proposition will be highlighted in the fol-
lowing section. This far, we have established conditions for the existence of
one corner equilibrium where all agents choose self-employment and there is
no modern sector. Now we study a diﬀerent possibility: no self-employment
and a modern sector with wage-employment and entrepreneurial activity.
As before, assume that at a given wage rate w∗ the income as a worker
of the less educated agent is equal to the income as a LSE (i.e. w∗H(0) =
¯ k(1−r)). If this is the case, since H(.) is an increasing function, every agent
with a level of human capital higher than 0 will choose to be worker over
been a LSE and, at a wage rate higher than w∗ = ¯ k(1 − r)/H(0), no agent
will choose to be a LSE since been a worker provides a higher return. Let
B1 = ¯ k(1 − r)/H(0), then
Lemma 4 If θh  = ∅ then w ≤ B1.14
Similarly, let w∗ be a wage rate such that the income of the LSE with
the lowest schooling level is equal to its income as a HSE (i.e. ¯ k(1 − r) =
¯ K[H(0)(1 − w∗) − r]). Solving for w∗ we get









Therefore, at a wage rate lower than B2, no even agent i = 0 will choose to
be a LSE since becoming a HSE provides a higher return. That is,
Lemma 5 If θh  = ∅ then w ≥ B2
The previous two lemmas present necessary conditions for the existence
an OEV that includes a self-employment sector. The following proposi-
tion presents conditions under which one of the necessary conditions is
always violated; therefore, if a OEV exists, the equilibrium is without a
self-employment sector. Let B = B2 − B1, then
Proposition 7 If ˆ X is an OEV and B > 0 then ˆ X = {∅,θW,θH}
We omit the proof since it follows an argument similar to the one used
in proposition 4. Notice that in proposition 7, we can not establish the
occupational distribution between workers and HSE since it depends on the
speciﬁc functional form of H(i). Therefore, we can not establish an existence
result, as in proposition 5. The following section will address these issues.
Previously, we showed that the converse of proposition 5 holds; however,
the converse of proposition 7 is false since we can build an economy where
ˆ X = {∅,θW,θH} represents an OEV and B ≯ 0 (the appendix presents a
counterexample).
Now, using propositions 4 and 7, the following corollary establishes nec-
essary conditions for the existence of an inside equilibrium:
Corollary 8 If ˆ Xrepresents an OEV such that θn are not empty sets for
all n ∈ O, then A < 0 and B < 0.
The results obtained this far can be summarize in ﬁgure 3. First, notice
that A > 0 can be rearranged as,
¯ K
1 + ¯ K
1
(1 − r)



























Figure 3: Corner Solutions
Similarly, arranging terms we can see that B > 0 implies,
¯ K
1 + ¯ K
1
(1 − r)
[H(0) − r] > ¯ k.
Notice that these two last inequalities are basically identical, the only diﬀer-
ence been that the ﬁrst one is in terms of H(1) while the second one depends
on H(0). Both are drawn in ﬁgure 3, where ¯ K/1 + ¯ K and ¯ k were chosen in
the axis since they have a linear relationship between them (this simpliﬁes
the presentation). We know that when the exogenous variables ¯ K/1 + ¯ K
and ¯ k are in the area where A > 0, because of proposition 5, there is an
OEV without a modern sector. On the other hand, if ¯ K/1 + ¯ K and ¯ k are
in the area where B > 0, and an equilibrium exists, because of proposition
7 we have θh = ∅ (no self-employment). The results are very intuitive, if
¯ k is a big enough, since the income of a LSE high, all agents will choose
this occupation. Similarly, if ¯ K is big enough , because of high productivity,
more agents will choose to be HSE, increasing the demand for labor, thus
the wage rate. Because of this, more agents will leave self-employment and
move into wage-employment.16
There is an issue in ﬁgure 3 that deserves some attention: notice that
point a represents an equilibrium without modern sector while in point b
there is no self-employment. However, we could prove that point a, because
of more resources, represents a higher level of per capita income even without
the presence of a modern sector. In other words, a contraction of the modern
sector together with an expansion of the self employment sector, does not
necessarily means economic stagnation.
Another issue deserves attention: consider the case when H(0) approaches
H(1), which means that more years of schooling provides little value added.
If this is the case, notice that the slopes for A = 0 and B = 0 will become
closer. Looking to ﬁgure 3, this means that the area between regions A > 0
and B > 0 vanishes as H(0) approaches H(1). In other words, low value
added shrinks the area for interior solutions and small movements in the
economy parameters will generate sharp shifts in the occupational composi-
tion of the economy. This raises an interesting conjecture: does low schooling
eﬃciency explain the sharp movements in and out of self-employment in less
developed countries?
Finally, there is another issue: notice that conditions A and B depend
on the values of H(1) and H(0). This means that if we are on a situation
where there is only a self-employment equilibrium and there is a change in
the function H(i) (such as an improvement in schooling eﬃciency), but H(1)
and H(0) remain unchanged, then the equilibrium will remain the same.
Similarly, assume we drop the assumption where schooling is distributed
uniformly in the [0,1] interval, and let most agents be part of the [a,1]
interval, where a > 1/2. If this is the case and H(1) and H(0) remain
unchanged, again the equilibrium will be the same one. This means that
to improve the education is not a suﬃcient condition in order to escape
from an equilibrium with low income and a peasant economy with only
self-employment.
5 The H(i) Function
In order to study more properties of the model, we introduce an speciﬁc
functional form for H(i). Assume that H : [0,1] → ℜ≥0 has the following
linear representation7,
H(i) = α + βi,
where the lowest level of high skill is H(0) = α and the highest is H(1) =
α+β. Recall from the previous section that sup(θh) = inf(θW). In order to
7All results from this section also hold for a logarithmic or an exponential function.17
simplify notation, let ihW ≡ sup(θh) = inf(θW). That is ihW represents the
agent which is indiﬀerent between self-employment and wage employment,
therefore the income from both occupations must be the same one (i.e.
IW(ihW) = Ih(ihW)), thus it must be the case that
¯ k(1 − r) = wH(ihW).
Substitute H(i) = α+βi in the preceding equation. Solving for ihW we get
ihW =






Similarly, we know that sup(θW (w)) = inf(θH (w)); thus, let iWH ≡
sup(θW (w)) = inf(θH (w)). Therefore, agent iWH is indiﬀerent between
been a worker or a HSE, that is
¯ K[H(iWH)(1 − w) − r] = wH(iWH).
Substituting H(i) and solving for iWH we get
iWH =
r






Notice that ihW and iWH are equivalent to H1 and H2 in ﬁgure 1 on page 9.
Now, if θH(w)  = ∅ and θW(w)  = ∅, we can specify the demand and supply








After evaluating the integral for H(i) = α + βi and substituting the
values for ihW and iWH2, it is not possible to ﬁnd a close form solution
for the equilibrium wage rate, therefore the following section presents some
numerical simulations.
5.1 Numerical Simulations
The exogenous parameters of the model are ξ = {r, ¯ k, ¯ K,α,β}. The ﬁrst
three numerical simulations will study the behavior of the percentage of
the population in self employment when the borrowings constraints and the
interest rate change. In what follows, let h represent the percentage of the
population in self-employment where, since all agents belong to the [0,1]
interval, we know that h = sup(θh) = ihw.18
5.2 Borrowing Constraint Changes
An increase in the values of ¯ k and ¯ K represent a relaxation of the borrowing
constraints for the LS and HS entrepreneurs. How ¯ k and ¯ K are chosen could
be explained by an exogenous borrowing story: ﬁrms with administrators
can get bigger maximum loans than ﬁrms without administrators, or alter-
natively, ﬁrms that hire high skill workers get big loans, while only small
loans are available to self-employment ﬁrms8.







Figure 4: ¯ K vs. h for ¯ k = (3/5,1,5/3)
Figure 4 presents a numerical simulation for (α,β,r) = (1,1,1/3), where
¯ K is in the x axis and h (percentage of self-employment) in the y axis.
This ﬁgure presents three curves: the furthermost to the left is drawn using
¯ k = 3/5, while ¯ k = 1 rests in the middle and, when ¯ k = 5/3, the curve is
drawn to the right. Notice that a relaxation of the borrowing constraint ¯ k
increases self-employment while an increase in ¯ K reduces it. The intuition
is straight forward: relaxing the ¯ k constraint, increases income for agents
in self-employment and agents move into this sector; in the other hand, an
increase in ¯ K, generates a higher demand for HS labor, thus the equilibrium
wage rate increases and self-employment will decrease. Notice that with
¯ k = 3/5 (the tightest constraint), the relative size of self-employment is
very sensitive to changes in ¯ K. Therefore, an interesting question arises:
Could sharp ﬂuctuations on the size of self-employment, characteristic of
developing countries, be explain by very tight borrowing constraints on the
8On an eﬀort to endogenize the borrowing constraint, we could have built a loan
function that depends on the schooling level.19
loans market for LSE?
It is important to make a ﬁnal methodological remark. In ﬁgure 4, the
computational program used for the numerical simulation did not draw the
kink of the curve at h = 1, this instruction was introduced to run the
simulation. Nevertheless, on a diﬀerent numerical simulation (not shown),
we found that when the value of h approaches the value of one we have
A < 0 and approaches the value of zero. Furthermore, when the value of h
is higher than one, the simulation shows that A > 0. Therefore, because of
proposition 5, we know that a unique OEV exist with h = 1.
5.3 Changes in the Interest Rate
The analysis of the consequences of a change in r it is not as straightforward.
First of all, a raise in r produces two opposing forces that aﬀect the new level
of self-employment. A decrease in the interest rate, increases proﬁts of the
HSE, thus increasing the demand for labor and the wage rate, thus reducing
the incentives toward self-employment. However, in the other hand, the
decrease in r raises the LSE income, thus improving the incentives to join
this sector. As a matter of fact, when r moves, for diﬀerent values of ξ
we could get a positive or a negative change in h. Nevertheless, to look
into the value of A (i.e. the condition for a corner solution) is an alternative
approach in order to look for the set of parameters for which we could expect
a positive or negative impact. First of all, taking the ﬁrst derivative of A








1 + ¯ K
− ¯ k),
where the sign of the derivative depends on the value of (
¯ K
1+ ¯ K − ¯ k). Two
curves are drawn in ﬁgures 5 and 6, the thicker one represents h while the
other one represents the value of A. In ﬁgure 5, when A remains positive
we have h = 1 and when A is negative (and decreases) the value of h starts
to decrease. In this ﬁgure, ¯ K = 50 and ¯ k = 3/2 therefore A
′
r < 0. On
the other hand, in ﬁgure 6, where ¯ k = .4, h increases together with r. As
before, we can see that for this set of parameters A
′
r > 0. The economic
intuition of these results suggest that if ¯ k is large enough, an increase in
the interest rate, because of higher costs, provides strong incentives to leave
the self-employment sector. On the other hand, if ¯ k is small enough, the
increase in costs for the LSE will small compare to the decrease in wages,
result of a lower demand for HS workers, thus some agents will move from
wage-employment to self-employment.20








Figure 5: h,A vs. r with ¯ K = 50 and ¯ k = 3/2








Figure 6: h,A vs. r with ¯ K = 50 and ¯ k = .421
Though it is not shown in both ﬁgures, as a result of a lower interest
rate, the average income per capita of the economy increases in both cases.9
Nevertheless, as we have seen, depending on the parameters of the model,
the LSE sector could expand or contract. That is, this exercise provides
conditions under which, given a change in r, the self-employment sector
behaves on a cyclical or countercyclical form.
5.4 Changes on Educational Eﬃciency
This section studies changes on the H(i) function.10 This far, we have
assumed that H(i) = α + βi, thus an increase in β symbolizes an overall
increase in high skill productivity.11 Therefore, we can expect an increase
in the number of HSE and an increase in wages, thus an incentive to leave
self-employment.







Figure 7: h vs. β for ¯ k = (3/2,5/2,4)
Figure 7 presents the results for changes in β and its impact on the
9Our measure of per capita income (net of cost of capital) is:
k(1 − r)ihW + K
R 1
iWH H(i)di − Kr(1 − iWH).
10We omit the low skill case since an increase in low skill productivity, because of the
binding borrowing constraint, has no impact on the equilibrium values of the economy.
Since all agents are indexed in the interval [0,1], that represents schooling level, we could
change the maximum years of schooling by indexing agents in the [0,s] interval, where an
increase in s represents an increase in the years of schooling of the most educated agent.
This section will follow a diﬀerent exercise: changes in the educational eﬃciency (i.e. the
H(i) function) which represents how schooling transfers into productive skills.
11We omit the exercise of an increasing α since the results are similar.22
proportion of agents in self-employment. The simulation was done with (α,
¯ K, r)=(1,5,3/2). Again, three curves are presented: the one to the left is
drawn with a value of ¯ k = 3/2, while the one further to the right uses a ¯ k = 4
value. As expected, we see a drop in the number of LSE. Again, notice that,
for low values of ¯ k and β, the proportion of agents in self-employment is
very sensitive to changes in β.
5.5 The Average Size of Business Firms
This far we have focus our analysis to changes in h. Nevertheless, as in
Lucas (1978), we can also study the average size of business ﬁrms (ASBF).
Figure 8 presents the changes in the proportion of the population who
chooses to be a HSE when there is an increase in ¯ K. Again, three curves
are drawn for β = (1,1.5,2), where a higher β shifts the curve upwards thus
increasing the number of HSE. Notice that the number of HSE, after an
initial increase, decreases as the value of ¯ K increases, as matter of fact, the
three functions converge to zero as ¯ K approaches inﬁnity. The result is not
surprising, since bigger ﬁrms increase their demand for labor (thus raising
wages), therefore agents shift from HSE to wage employment. However, the
following results might result a little surprising.
Figure 9 presents the numerical results where the average size of business
ﬁrms (i.e. the number of workers divided by the amount of HSE) is drawn
against ¯ K, again three curves are drawn for β = (1,1.5,2), where a rise in
β shift the curve upwards. First, notice that the ASBF increases as ¯ K in-
creases, probably not very surprising since the proportion of HSE converges
to zero as ¯ K increases. What might be a little surprising is the impact on
the ASBF when β raises. First, as we mentioned before, the number of HSE
increases when the schooling eﬃciency is higher, therefore we might expect
a decreases in the ASBF. However, the ASBF increases. The explanation is
provided in the previous section, where an increase in β reduces the number
of agents in self-employment, therefore when β increases we have more HSE
but also more workers, therefore the ASBF increases.
Wrapping up, high borrowing constraints in the modern sector of the
economy, and low schooling eﬃciency are characteristic of less developed
economies; therefore, probably consistent with most observations for devel-
oping countries, our model predicts a small size of business ﬁrms.23








Figure 8: HSE vs. ¯ K for β = (1,1.5,2)










Figure 9: ASBF vs. ¯ K for β = (1,1.5,2)24
5.6 Changes in the Distribution of Schooling Resources
This section introduces a diﬀerent H(i) distribution for the transfer of
schooling into high skill productivity. This will allow us to study some
public policy choices. Assume that a policy maker has the possibility of
shifting resources in order to increase eﬃciency in the later years of school-
ing. For example, we could reduce resources in elementary and secondary

























Figure 10: Two H(i) Distributions
Figure 10 captures the objective of this policy alternative: to select the
parameters for both distributions in such a way that the area under the
curve is the same for both distributions, thus the total amount of value
added from schooling remains the unchanged. In this ﬁgure, the α2 + β2(i)
distribution generates higher returns on the later years of education, while
punishing the returns from early schooling. The numerical simulations from
this section have mostly work with the values (α,β) = (1,1), this same
values will represent the ﬁrst distribution. For the second distribution, we
choose (α,β) = (0,3) since with this parameters the area under the curve
is the same for both distributions. The results for the numerical simula-
tions are shown on ﬁgures 11 and 12, where the policy shift is represented
by the thicker graph. Figure 11 shows that, for low levels of ¯ K, the25








Figure 11: h vs. ¯ K for (α,β) = (1,1) and (α,β) = (0,3)






Figure 12: Per Capita Income vs. ¯ K for (α,β) = (1,1) and (α,β) = (0,3)26
number of LSE decreases with (α,β) = (0,3). However, for high levels of
¯ K the result is reversed. The initial decrease is not diﬃcult to see since,
with higher eﬃciency for the HSE, the demand for labor increases together
with the equilibrium wage rate, thus driving down the number of agents
in self-employment. In the other hand, we know that h decreases when
¯ K increases; however, the policy shift makes H(0) = 0, meaning that is
harder to reduce self-employment since the income from wage-employment
has decreased substantially for low levels of schooling.
An interesting result is depicted in ﬁgure 12, where the numerical simu-
lation shows how the per capita income has increased with the new policy.
The intuition is straightforward: the new distribution frees resources from
low levels of schooling, which are idle since people with low schooling will
join self-employment anyway. This idle resources increases productivity of
HSE, thus proﬁts increase together with salaries. Also, agents that switch
from LSE to wage employment will improve their welfare level. Therefore,
choosing the opposite policy (i.e. reducing resources in higher education),
since you are educating agents which will not use the new learn skills, will
lead to a higher self-employment sector and lower per capita income. Notice
that this exercise does not takes into account the dynamic aspects of the
policy. More precisely, increasing resources in early schooling might increase
the learning capacities of agents at later years; that is, the H(i) curve could
experience a upward shift on the long run. Our model can not capture the
dynamic aspects from this policy change.
6 Conclusions and Extensions
This paper studied some income per capita issues. However, welfare consid-
erations were not tackled in depth. An interesting challenge is the choice of
an appropriate welfare measure. One candidate could be the average income
of each sector of the economy. However, this measure could be misleading.
For example, a policy that reduces the income of the HSE will bring about
a movement from HSE to wage earners but, since the poorer HSE will leave
this sector, it could be that the per capita income of the sector increases,
signaling incorrectly that the welfare of this sector has improved. On this
work, a deeper analysis of welfare issues is lacking. Nevertheless, it seems
that the task could be interesting and challenging.
We studied some development issues and the conditions under which the
self-employment sector behaves on a cyclical or counter cyclical form. Also,
since this paper is centered on human capital diﬀerences, we paid special27
attention to the success or failure of schooling eﬃciency. Nonetheless, some
extension could be made in order to study alternative policy issues. Among
them:
1. Minimum wage considerations could be introduced in order to study
welfare considerations.
2. As we mentioned on section 2, agents do not have the choice of volun-
tary unemployment. Extensions can be introduced in order to study
unemployment compensation policies.
3. Recall that the parameters ¯ k and ¯ K are exogenous to the model. An in-
teresting extensions could be to introduce endogenous borrowing con-
straint. A possibility is to attach borrowing constraints to educational
attainment, this way the model could produce a new sector of LSE
that hire workers and are richer than wage earners (but poorer than
HSE). That is, we could build a model as in Banerjee and Newman
(1993) and Antunes and Cavalcanti (2002), but without ruling out the
presence of LSE that choose self-employment activities and are poorer
than agents in wage-employment. This way the model could produce
a richer set of occupational choices.
4. A consequence of adopting a uniform distribution where agents belong
to the closed interval [0,1], as we did in this paper, is that there are no
two agents with the same schooling level, which is highly unrealistic.
A follow up to this model could consist in adopting more realistic
schooling distributions.
While it is not diﬃcult to introduce and study these extensions, we de-
cided not to deviate from the original objective of this work: a) to show that
traditional models on occupational choice are not the best way to describe
some facts from some developing economies and b) to build a model that
rationalizes observations from these economies.28
Appendix
Lemma 1. The sets θi are convex.





∈ θh(w), where i
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and α ∈ [0,1]. Assume that i < i′. Since
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′
∈ θh(w) we know that ¯ k(1−r) > wH(i
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), so ¯ k(1 − r) >wH(i
′′
).
It is left to prove that ¯ k(1 − r) > IH(i′′) = ¯ K[(1 − w)H(i
′′
) − r)]. Again, since
i < i′ ∈ θh(w), we know that ¯ k(1−r) > IH(i) and ¯ k(1−r) > IH(i′). If (1−w) > 0
then IH() is increasing in i and ¯ k(1 − r) > IH(i′) ≥ IH(i′′). If it is the case that
(1 − w) ≤ 0 then IH() is not increasing in i and ¯ k(1 − r) > IH(i) ≥ IH(i′′) so we
have ¯ k(1 − r) > IH(i′′)
A similar argument holds for b) Convexity of θW and c) Convexity of θH.
Proposition 1. i) if i ∈ θh and i∗ ∈ θW then i ≤ i∗ and ii) i ∈ θW and i∗ ∈ θH
then i ≤ i∗.
i) Since i ∈ θh(w) then ¯ k(1 − r) > wH(i). Also, since i∗ ∈ θW(w), then
wH(i∗) > ¯ k(1 − r) therefore H(i∗) > H(i). We know that H(i) is an increasing
function, therefore i∗ > i. ii) Since i ∈ θW(w), then wH(i) > ¯ K[(1 − w)H(i) − r)].
Rearranging terms we get r > H(i)[(1 − w) − w
¯ K]. Also, since i∗ ∈ θH(w), it
must be the case that ¯ K[(1 − w)H(i∗) − r)] < wH(i∗). Rearranging terms we get
H(i∗)[(1 − w) − w
¯ K] > r therefore H(i∗) > H(i). Thus, since H(i) is an increasing
function, we have i∗ > i.
Proposition 2. i) if i ∈ θh and i∗ ∈ θW then Ih(i) ≤ IW(i∗) and ii) if i ∈ θW and
i∗ ∈ θH then IW(i) ≤ IH(i∗).
i) By deﬁnition we know that Ih(i) = ¯ k(1 − r) and that Iw(i∗) = wH(i), since
i∗ ∈ θW(w) it must be the case that wH(i∗) > ¯ k(1 − r), therefore Iw(i∗) > Ih(i).
ii) By deﬁnition we know that Iw(i) = wH(i) and that IH(i∗) = ¯ K[(1 −
w)H(i∗) − r)]. Since i∗ ∈ θH(w) it must be the case that ¯ K[(1 − w)H(i∗) − r)] >
wH(i∗). From proposition 1 we know that if i ∈ θW(w) and i∗ ∈ θH(w) then i > i∗.
We know that H(i) is an increasing function and i∗ > i, then H(i∗) > H(i), there-
fore ¯ K[(1 − w)H(i∗) − r)] > wH(i∗) > wH(i) which proves that IH(i∗) > Iw(i).
Proposition 3. If θj (w) are not empty sets then: i) inf(θh) = 0, ii) sup(θH) = 1,
iii) sup(θh) = inf(θW) and iv) sup(θW) = inf(θH).
i) Let i′ = inf(θh(w)). Assume that i′  = 0,then 0 / ∈ θh(w) and either 0 ∈ θW(w)
or 0 ∈ θH(w). If 0 ∈ θW(w) then it exists an i′′ = 0 such that i′′ ∈ θW(w) where
i′′ < i′. This contradicts proposition 2 where if i′′ ∈ θW(w) then i′′ > i for all
i ∈ θh(w). We build the same argument for the 0 ∈ θH(w) case.29
ii) Let i′ = sup(θH(w)). Assume that i′  = 1,then 1 / ∈ θH(w) and either
1 ∈ θW(w) or 1 ∈ θh(w). If 1 ∈ θW(w) then it exists an i′′ = 1 such that
i′′ ∈ θW(w) and i′′ > i′. This contradicts proposition 2 where if i′′ ∈ θW(w) then
i′′ < i for all i ∈ θH(w). We build the same argument for the case where 1 ∈ θh(w).
iii) Assume that sup(θh(w))  = inf(θW(w)). Let i′ = sup(θh(w)) and i′′ =
inf(θW(w)). If i′ > i′′ then there exist i′ ∈ θh(w) and i′′ ∈ θW(w) such that
i′ > i′′. This contradicts proposition 2 where if i′′ ∈ θW(w) then i′′ > i for all
i ∈ θh(w). Now if sup(θh(w)) < inf(θW(w)) then it must exist an i′′′ ∈ θH(w)
such that sup(θh(w)) < i′′′ < inf(θW(w)). Recall that 1 ∈ θH(w) therefore i′′′ <
inf(θW(w)) ≤ 1, but since i′′′ ∈ θH(w), this violates the convexity of θH(w) from
proposition 1.
iv) Assume that sup(θW(w))  = inf(θH(w)). Let i′ = sup(θW(w)) and i′′ =
inf(θH(w)). If i′ > i′′ then there exist i′ ∈ θW(w) and i′′ ∈ θH(w) such that
i′ > i′′. This contradicts proposition 2 where if i′′ ∈ θH(w) then i′′ > i for all
i ∈ θW(w). Now if sup(θW(w)) < inf(θH(w)) then it must exist an i′′′ ∈ θh(w)
such that sup(θW(w)) < i′′′ < inf(θH(w)). Recall that 0 ∈ θh(w) therefore 0 ≤
sup(θW(w)) < i′′′, but since i′′′ ∈ θh(w), this violates the convexity of θh(w) from
proposition 1.
Proposition 6. If ˆ X = {[0,1],∅,∅} represents an OEV then A > 0.
Let w∗ represent the equilibrium wage rate. Since θW are θH empty sets, it must
be the case that for all agents:
¯ K[H(i)(1 − w
∗) − r] < ¯ k(1 − r) and w
∗H(i) < ¯ k(1 − r)
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Rearranging terms we get:






Again, rearranging terms we get:
¯ K
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That is, A > 0.
The Counterexample for the converse of Proposition 7. We are looking for
a set of parameters such that ˆ X = {∅,θW,θH} represents an OEV and B ≯ 0. Let
H(i) = α+βi. Also, choose (r,α,β, ¯ K,¯ k) = (1/3,1,1,5,1). Using this parameters,
it is the case that B < 0. We have left to prove that there is an OEV with no30
self-employment for this set of parameters. Choose w∗ = .68 as candidate for
equilibrium wage. We can see that ¯ k(1 − r) < w∗H(0), which means that the
agent with the lowest schooling level is better oﬀ in wage employment than in self-
employment, therefore no agent will choose at w∗ self-employment as an occupation.
We can also prove that for w∗ = .68 labor supply equals demand for labor; therefore,
ˆ X = {∅,θW,θH} is an OEV for this economy.
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